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The executive power under the Constitution of the United
States is vested in the President. In the administration of
that power much must, necessarily, be left to his discretion.
In the formal constitution of a government, the written
instrument cannot precisely define the modes by which thepowers granted shall be exercised. The implication is, that
when any department of the government is charged with
a duty, it may do, under the limitations of the Constitution,
what is necessary and proper, in order to perform it. Hence,
as the President is clothed with the executive power of thegovernment, he may use all subordinate and ancillary powers
essential to its due exercise.
As was said by Chief Justice MARSHALL in Marbury v.
Madison, i Cranch. 137 , 165: "By the Constitution of the
United States the President is invested with certain important
political powers, in the"exercise, of which he is to use his own.
discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his
political character and to his own conscience . . . and what-

ever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which.
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executive discretion may be used, still there exists and can.
exist no power to control that discretion. The subjects are
political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and
being intrusted to the Executive the decision of the Executive
is conclusive."
(I.). The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several States, when called into the active service of the
United States,
(2.) He has the power to make, with the sanction of the
Senate, treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every
other description, subject to only one limitation, namely, that
the treaties thus made shall not violate the principles of the
,Constitution.
(3.) He has the power, too, with the like sanction, to
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
By international usage four classes of diplomatic agents are
recognized. First: Ambassadors, papal legates and nuncios;
second. Envoys and ministers plenipotentiary accredited to
the sovereign; third: Ministers resident, accredited to the
sovereign; fourth: Charg6s d'Affaires, accredited to the
Minister of Foreign.Affairs.
Congress has no legislative power to create the office of
"public minister." Any attempt to do so by introducing a new
nomenclature, and, designating a commissioner with inferior
and temporary functions as a "public minister," or "diplomatic officer,", who must be appointed with the advice and
sanction of the Senate, would exceed the legislative power.
Of course, if a commissioner is, in fact, d. "public minister"
with diplomatic functions and rights under the law of nations,
then, undoubtedly, his appointment must be with the sanction
of the Senate, but irrespective of any Act of Congress, and
irrespective of his official designation.
The offices of these ministers do not exist under or by virtue of any Act of Congress, but under the Constitution and
under the law and usages of nations. It is to these offices
thus existing that appointments are made by the President
-,with the advice and consent of the Senate. Persons not
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.appointed to fill these offices are not, in the constitutional
sense, and in the sense of the law of nations, "public
ministers."
Persons appointed foi a special and temporary
purpose in connection with foreign affairs, and whose employment ceases when the purpose is accomplished, are mere
pro tempore aids to the President in the performance of his
executive functions.
The President is the official head and representative of his
country in its intercourse with foreign nations. Our ministers
to those nations do not possess any defined, substantive
powers, but they act under his instructions. "Within the
range of constitutional authority, they have such powers as
the President sees fit to grant, and no more" (C. Cushing,
7 Opinions of Attorney-General, 2 1).
An ambassador or other public minister is an officer of the
United States, and holds an office under the Government of
the United States. An agent sent out to a foreign country to
investigate, to ascertain and report facts, or to negotiate a
treaty, does not hold an office; but is engaged ir a temporary employment. An office is a continuing position, and
though the incumbent be changed, the duties remain. But an
employment which is transient, occasional or incidental, can
in no proper sense be termed an office.
InUnited States v. Hartwell, 6 Wallace, 385, 393, the distinction is clearly stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
"An office," said the Court, "is a public station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of the government. The
term embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument and
duties. The employment of the defendant was in the public
service of the United States. He was appointed pursuant to
law, and his compensation was fixed by law. Vacating the
office of his superior would -not have affected the tehiure of his
place. His duties were continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary.",
In United States v. 'Germaine, 9 Otto, 508, 512, the
Supreme Court, by reference to United States v. Hartwell, reaffirmed its definition of office as a position whose duties were
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continuing and permanent,

not occasional and temporary.

"In the case before us," said the Court, through Mr. Justice
MILLER, "the duties are not continuing and permanent, and
they are occasional and intermittent."
It has been the theory and practice throughout all periods of
our government, for the President, in conducting its foreign
affairs, to appoint special agents for special and temporary purposes; agents whose duties are not "continuing and
permanent," but "occasional and temporary." And it is obser vable that among the most illustrious of our presidents and
statesmen none have doubted that these appointments were a
due exercise of executive authority, and did not need the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Mr. Cushing, when Attorney General of the United States
under President Pierce, in his letter to Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of State, on the Act of Congress, entitled, "An Act to
iremodel the diplomatic and consular systems of the United
States," gives a resum6 of cases, "in illustration of the power
of the Executive to negotiate," as follows:
"President Washington granted to David Humphreys, on
the second of March, 1793,. without the previous concurrence of the Senate,; a commission as commissioner plenipotentiary to treat with Algiers.
"Passing over intermediate incidents of the same nature, we
come to the case of Charles Rhind, David Offley and Commissioner James Biddle, who, on the twelfth of September,
1829, were commissioned by President Jackson as joint and
several ' Commissioners of the United States' to negotiate and
did negotiate the existing treaty between fhe United States .and
Turkey.
"The same President, on the twenty-sixth of January, 1832,
appointed Edmund Roberts as 'Commissioner of the United
States' to negotiate treaties with the governments of CochinChina and Siam; the result of, which was the existing conventions .with Muscat and Siam.
"On the sixteenth of August, 1849, Joseph Balestier received
from President Taylor the appointment of 'Special agent of
the United States' to Cochin-China and other parts of
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Southeastern Asia; out of which came our treaty with
BQmeo.
"In conclusion of these precedents, we have the late case of
the bppointment of Commissioner Matthew C. Perry, under
commission from President Fillmore of the thirteenth of

November, 1852, to negotiate with Japan.
"We have modem examples, indeed, of commissions of the
same nature for negotiations with some of the nations of
Christendom, among which the following may be noted:
"On the third of May, 1838, Nathaniel Niles was commissioned by President Van Buren as ' Special agent of the
United States' to the kingdom of Sardinia, and as such
negotiated our treaty with Sardinia.
"On the twenty-eighth of March, 1846, A. Dudley Mann
was appointed by President Polk 'Special agent of the United
States ' to treat with sundry States of Germany, and as such
agent he negotiated the treaty with Hanover.
"Now, in the. case of neither of these appointments, covering,
as they did, important negotiations in Europe as well as in
Asia, was there any authorizing Act of Congress, any preparatory specific appropriation, nor even a commission by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. In each instance,
the successive Presidents acted, as did the earlier Presidents in
consimili casu, in virtue of their constitutional power ' to make
treaties,' that is, to negotiate and prepare them for the consideration of the Senate, just as in virtue of direct authority
of the constitution, and without the aid of any mere enabling
statute, he has the power to grant pardons for offences against
the United States."
The foregoing are cases cited by Mr. Cushing; but the
list is not complete. Succeeding administrations followed in
the same line and under the same constitutional sanction.
General Jackson appointed Edmund Roberts, of Pbrtsmouth,
N. H., a sea captain, as his agent, to visit the Indian Ocean for
the purpose of examining the means of extending the commerce of the United States by commercial arrangements with
the powers whose dominions bordered on those seas. He
embarked on board of the United States sloop-of-war, the
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Peacock, rating as captain's clerk, carrying with him blank
letters of credence, and with instructions from Edward Livingston, Secretary of State, that if he should find the prospect
favorable, he might fill up one of his letters to the Emperor
of Japan for the purpose of opening trade." Did this create
a breach of the constitution ? Was this a usurpation on the
part of the President? If so, it was not perceived by Mr.
Livingston, who was a statesman and constitutional lawyer
of great ability, not so great, perhaps, as the ability of present
Senatorial critics, but who stood among the intellectual giants
of his time, if not first, yet in the very first line.
In June, 185 I, Mr. Webster, Secretary of State, inistructed
Commodore Aulick to proceed to Yeddo in his flag-ship, with
as many vessels of his squadron as might conveniently- be
employed in the service, and deliver to such high officers of
the Emperor of Japan as might be appointed to receive it-a
letter from President Fillmore to the Emperor. The ostensible
purpose of this visit, a visit in force, and suggestive of the
uz'tma ratio, was to arrange for supplies of coal; but Commodore Aulick received "full power to negotiate and sign a
treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and
the Empire of Japdn." In November, 1852, Commodore
Perry, with an increased force, and with a copy of CommQdore Aulick's instructions, which he was directed to consider
as "in full force and applicable to his command, " was sent to
Japan, and where, as is well known, he concluded a treaty
with the Emperor on the thirty-first of March, 1.854.
In none of these instances were the agents nominated to
the Senate, -but were appointed by ar act of executive
authority alone. Nor were the names of Czsar A. Rodney,
Theoderick Bland and John Graham sent to the Senate, who
went out in a ship-of-war during the South American wars of
Independence in I816, as commissioners by appointment of
Mr. Monroe, to inquire into the .condition of affairs in those
colonies, and to report as to whether they were likely to be
successful.in thepending struggle. This was done to aid the
President in considering the question whether to acknowledge
their independence. When they sailed the Senate was in
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session, but, as we have seen, they were not nominated to that
body, nor were their expenses paid out of the contingent
fund. They were subsequently paid by Congress; Congress
thereby becoming partici.s criminis in this violation of the
constitution !
During the Hungarian struggle for independence, President Taylor appointed Mr. Dudley Mann his agent, and in-.
vested him with power to declare to the Hungarians the willingness of the United States promptly to recognize their
independence in the event of their ability to sustain it. His
instructions were "to obtain information in regard to Hungary, and her resources and prospects, with a view to an early
recognition of her independence and the formation of commercial relations with her."
Here was the delegation, as has been said, of sovereign
powers to an agent, and that agent, not nominated to the
Senate! And yet no one, so far as we know, was so bold as
to claim that his appointment by President Taylor was an
unconstitutional exercise of executive authority.
We had at the time a minister at the Court of Vienna,
regularly appointed by the President of the United States,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and it might
occur to those even who are not at all times accustomed "to
peep narrowly into marrow bones," that it was a part, and a
necessary part, of his diplomatic functions, in so grave a conjuncture, to obtain and furnish to his government information
in regard to a rebellious province of the Empire to which he
was accredited, and to keep it constantly advised as to the
resources and prospects of the rebels.
It might be said, with great semblance of truth, if not with
truth itself, that the functions of the known and acknowledged
minister were, pro tanto, superseded by an unknown and secret
agent, for his instructions enjoined on him not "to give publicity to his mission." *And yet, the constitutional power of the
President alone to make the appointment was not questioned,
and this, too, at a period when the Senate of the United States
was composed of abilities equal to any that have distinguished
that body at any period of its history.
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Austria, indeed, complained and reminded our government
that "those who did not hesitate to assume the responsibility
of sending Mr. Dudley Mann on such an errand, should, inde.dendent of considerations of propriety, have borne in mind
that they were exposing their emissary to be treated as a spy."
Mr. Webster replied to the Austrian protest and complaint
.in his well-known letter to Mr. Hfilsmann.
"The
American Government," he said, "sought for nothing but
truth; it desired to learn the facts through a reliable source.
. . . Mr. Mann's mission was wholly unobjectioiable and
strictly within the rule of the law of nations, and the duty of
the United States as a neutral power."
It was not foreseen by Mr. Webster that one of his successors in that Senate over which he fulmined, would denounce
the desire of .President Cleveland to learn the facts respecting
the revolution in Honolulu through a reliable source, as President Taylor desired to do with respet to the revolution in
Hungary, as a bold and utter violation of the Constitution of
the United States! And yet, President Cleveland, hiaving
withdrawn the treaty with Hawaii, submitted to the .Senate by
his predecessor for further consideration, was especially desirous of learning the exact facts of the situation, so that he
might intelligently act with regard to them. It was a pending and pressing question.
During the Mexican war Mr. N. P. Trist, Chief Clerk
in the Department of State, was sent to the headquarters
of our army, under General Scott, without the sanction of the
Senate, 'clothed with full powers to cQnclude a treaty of
peace with the Mexican Gov ernment, shodld it be so inclined.'
Should he arrange for a suspension of hostilities, then the army
and navy were to !"act in accordance with his directions and
suspend actual hostilities until further orders from the Department."
Mr. Trist, as is well known, concluded a treaty of peace
with Mexico, which was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 38
yeas to J4 nays; and the wise men of that day did not
deny the executive authority to appoint the negotiator without the.advice and consent of the Senate, nor criticise the fact
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'that Mr. Trist was invested with full power to arrange for a
.suspension of hostilities, without the intervention of either the
naval or military commander, both of whom quoad hoc were
.subject to his directions.
It is needless to multiply examples, and we shall cite but
one other, showing how uniform has been the practice of successive Presidents to appoint, upon their executive authority
.alone, these special diplomatic agents. * About four months
.after the inauguration of President Grant, a negotiation was
opened for the annexation of the Dominican Republic. Mr.
Blaine, in his twenty years in Congress, Vol.. 2, p. 468, tells
the story, as follows: "In July General 0. E. Babcock, one
of the President's private secretaries, was despatched to San
Domingo, upon an errand of which the public knew nothing.
He bore a letter of instructions from Secretary Fish, apparently limiting the mission to an enquiry into the condition,
prospects and resources of the island. From its tenor the
negotiation of a treaty at that time was not anticipated by the
State Department. General Babcock's mission finally resulted,
however, in a treaty for the annexation of the Republic of
Dominica, and a convention for the lease of the bay and
peninsular of Samana-separately negotiated, and both concluded on the twenty-ninth of November, 1869."
President Grant laid this treaty, apparently negotiated by
his special agent under secret instructions, before the Senate,
and it was rejected. And what is observable is this, that the
executive authority to send a special agent, without the advice
and consent of the Senate, and the negotiation of a treaty by
such agent, providing for the annexation of a foreign country
-to the United States, was not questioned by the Senate. The
Senate of that day had not risen to the height of the great
argument! It did not perceive the rent in the constitutional
vesture ! It did not seem conscious of the grave. usurpation
of the President, and his disregard of its dignity and powers !
It will be remarktd that in the instances which we have
cited of the appointment by the Executive of these diplomatic
agents, the Senate was sometimes in session at the date of
their appointment, and sometimes not.
But in the greater
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number of instances it- was in session. That, however, is an
immaterial circumstance. If he has the constitutional power
of appointment alone it is of no consequence whether he
appoints during the session or vacation of the Senate: And
that he has this power we have endeavored to show.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy the President
may invest our ministers abroad with discretionary power
to use the naval forces of the government stationed in
their respective jurisdictions to protect American life and
property. And 'as such Commander-in-Chief he may, in a
particular instance, and in the exercise of his discretion, withdraw such power from the resident minister, and -confer it
upon a special commissioner, entrusted with a temporary
duty. The wisdom of such withdrawal is a matter of purely
executive discretion, and the decision of the Executive is conclusive.
The resident minister acts under instructions from the President. The President to enable his special commissioner more
efficiently to perform the particular duty with which he is
charged, may withdraw, pro tanto and pro hac vice, his instructions from the permanent minister, and make them applicable to the temporary commissioner. This does not change
the character of the latter's service.
In accord with .these principles were the instructions.
of the President, through the Department of State, to Mr.
Blount, his special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands.
"You will investigate," says the Secretary, Mr. Gresham;
"and fully rep6rt to the President all the facts you can learn
respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the
causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government
was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward the
existing authority and, in general, all that can fully enlighten
the President touching the subjects of your mission.
"To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all
matters touching the relations 'of this Government to the
existing or other government of the Islands, and the protection of our citizens therein is paramount, and in you alone,
acting in co6peration with the commander of the naval forces,
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is vested full discretion and power to determine when such
forces should be landed or withdrawn.
"You are, however, authorized to avail yourself of such aid
and information as you may desire from the present minister
of the United States at Honolulu, Mr. John L. Stevens, who
will continue until further notice to perform the usual functions attaching to his office not inconsistent with the powers
intrusted to you. An instruction will be sent to Mr. Stevens,
directing him to facilitate your presentation to the head of the
Government upon your arrival, and to render you all needed
assistance."
As commentary upon the constitutionality and propriety
of these instructions nothing more need be desired than the
report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Although the vox dei is not always recognizable in the utterances
of a majority, yet the report of this committee on this particular
question, speaks, at any rate, the language of statesmanship
and constitutional law. It is as follows:
"A question tias been made as to the right of the President
of the United States to dispatch Mr. Blount to Hawaii as his
personal representative for the purpose of seeking the further
information, which, the President believed, was necessary in
order to arrive at a just conclusion regarding the state of
affairs in Hawaii. Many precedents could be quoted to show
that such power has been exercised by the President on various occasions without dissent on the part of Congress .or the
people of the United States. The employment of. such
agencies is a necessary part of the proper exercise of the diplomatic power, which is intrusted by the Constitution with the
the President. Without such authority our foreign relations
would be so embarrassed with difficulties that it would be impossible to conduct them with safety of success. These precedents also show that the Senate of the United States, though
in session, need not be consulted as to the appointment of such
agents, or as to the inftructions which the President may give
them.
"An authority was intrusted to Mr. Blount to remove the
American flag from the Government building in Hawaii, and
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to disclaim, openly and practically, the protectorate which had
been announced in that country by Minister Stevens, and also
to remove the troops from Honolulu to the steamer Boston.
This particular delegation of authority to Mr. Blount was
paramount over the authority of Mr. Stevens, who was continued as minister resident of the United States at Honolulu,
and 'it raised the question whether the Government of the
United States can have at the same foreign capital two ministers, each of whom shall exercise separate and special
powers.
"There seems to be no reason why the Government of the
United States can not, in conducting its diplomatic intercourse
with other countries, exercise powers as broad and general, or
as limited and peculiar, or special, as any other government.
Other governments have been for many years, and even
centuries, in the habit of intrusting special and particular
missions to one man representing them in a foreign court, and
to several men in combination when that was found to be
desirable. In fact, there has been no limit placed upon the use
of a power of this kind, except the discretion of the sovereign
or ruler of the country. The committee fail to see that there
is any irregularity in such a course as that, or that the power
given to Mr. Blount to withdraw the troops from Honolulu, or
to lower the flag of the United States, was to any extent either
dangerous*or interrupting to any other lawful authority existing there in any diplomatic or naval officer. There may be a
question as to the particular wording of the order which MrBlount gave to Admiral Skerrett for the lowering of the flag
and the withdrawal of the troops, but that is a hypercriticism, .
because the substantial fact was that Mr. Blount executed the
command of the President in communicating to Admiral
Skerrett such order, s the order of the President of the
Untted States. W Blount's authority had been known to
Admiral Skerrett; his instructions had been exhibited to
Admiral Skerrett; and they both understood that what Mr.
Blount was then doing had received the sanction of the President of the United States before Mr. Blount had entered upon
the discharge of his ministerial functions, and that his act

